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TOWARDS A NEW CORE
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT NORM:
THE REVERSE THREE-STEP TEST
Daniel J. Gervais *a1

Introduction
1

Copyright is dead. The first to pronounce its passing was probably John Perry
Barlow. In his famous 1994 essay, The Economy of Ideas, 2 he defended the theory
that dematerialization has made copyright, which was designed to protect the bottle
and not the wine, irrelevant, for

* Vice-Dean, Research and Professor of Technology Law, Faculty of Law, (Common Law Section), University
of Ottawa. Visiting Scholar, Stanford Law School (2004). The author wishes to acknowledge the financial
support of the Centre for Innovation Law and Policy of the University of Toronto and of Bell University Labs.
The author is indebted to Alex Cameron, LL.M., University of Ottawa, and Marina Pavlovic, LL.D. candidate at
the same university, for their diligent research assistance. The author also wishes to acknowledge constructive
suggestions made by Professors Anupam Chander and David Nimmer and students in Professor Chander's hightech contract & property seminar at Stanford Law School (Winter '04), where an earlier version of this paper
was presented.
1
Eben Moglen uses a "Star Wars" analogy to make the point: "the obsolescence of the IPdroid is neither
unforeseeable nor tragic. Indeed it may find itself clanking off into the desert, still lucidly explaining to an
imaginary room the profitably complicated rules for a world that no longer exists." Anarchism Triumphant:
Free Software and the Death of Copyright, in The Commodification of Information 107, 131 (Niva Elkin-Koren
& Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002).
2
John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Patents and Copyrights in the Digital Age.
(Everything you know about intellectual property is wrong.). Wired, 2.03, Mar. 1994, available at http://
www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas_pr.html.
Copyright worked well because, Gutenberg notwithstanding, it was hard to make a book.
Furthermore, books froze their contents into a condition that was as challenging to alter as it was to
reproduce. . . . For all practical purposes, the value was in the conveyance and not the thought
conveyed. . . .
...
In other words, the bottle was protected, not the wine. Now, as information enters Cyberspace, the
native home of Mind, these bottles are vanishing.
Id.
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in the digital era the bottle has disappeared. He then handed down his verdict, with no
possible appeal:
Intellectual property law cannot be patched, retrofitted, or expanded to
contain the gasses of digitized expression any more than real estate law might
be revised to cover the allocation of broadcasting spectrum (which, in fact,
rather resembles what is being attempted here). We will need to develop an
entirely new set of methods as befits this entirely new set of circumstances. 3
In the slipstream of this former rancher and spokesperson for the Grateful Dead,
academics in the United States and in other countries began to explain why copyright
had become obsolete in the Internet era. 4 However, the funeral was perhaps a bit
premature. Copyright is still with us, and few can prove that a capitalist society 5
without something like copyright would ensure as well, or better, the creation and
distribution of new works.
But certain blows have been dealt. First of all, it must be said that the copyright
industries the so-called "rightsholders" have not been dazzling in their rush to adapt to
the Internet. These industries have
3

Id.
The reader will find a good example in the article by Glynn S. Lunney Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital
Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 Va. L. Rev. 813 (2001):
COPYRIGHT is dead. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") has killed it. With the
enactment of the DMCA, there is a very real danger that our system of protecting creative works will
serve primarily private interests. If so, then the protection of creative works will have come full circle .
. . and copyright, in the sense of protection intended primarily to serve the public interest, will surely
have died.
Id. at 815. See also Robert C. Denicola, Mostly Dead? Copyright Law in the New Millennium, 47 J.
Copyright Soc'y USA 193, 207 (2000).
Yet how much of the old, legislatively-defined copyright will remain relevant in the new
Millennium? Copyright law may be mostly dead in the wake of the DMCA, but 'mostly dead is still
alive.' Traditional copyright will no doubt remain as a convenient if redundant alternative to breach of
contract. Copyright law will also be necessary for works that leak out of their containers and are
accessible without a contract. We may also need traditional-looking copyright law to pursue stronger
protection abroad.
Id. at 206-07.
5
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
"[C]opyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the
exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of
knowledge . . . . The profit motive is the engine that ensures the progress of science." Rewarding
authors for their creative labor and "promot[ing] . . . . Progress" are thus complementary; as James
Madison observed, in copyright "[t]he public good fully coincides . . . with the claims of individuals."
Id. 212 n.18. (internal citations omitted).
4
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essentially fought the Internet, and the music and movie industries are still fighting. 6
I was among those who suggested in 1998 that a "business model" approach be used. 7
The text industry and scientific journals put their material online four or five years
ago, and some have considerably broadened the choices offered to their readers,
whether by making available lab data files (too voluminous to print out), or threedimensional models of molecules, or simply by accelerating distribution. 8
After some setbacks concerning standardization issues, 9 and many sensational trials
aiming to impede exchanges of files between Web surfers on a central site 10 or a
peer-to-peer network, the recording industry is just starting to authorize downloading
of music files. 11 The movie industry is still testing distribution systems.

6

We might remember the fight against the photocopier. In a 1961 report of the Register of Copyrights in the
United States, a similar alarm was being sounded: "Copying has now taken on new dimensions with the
development of photocopying devices by which any quantity of material can be reproduced readily and in
multiple copies . . . ." Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law
(Jul. 25, 1961).
7
Daniel Gervais, Electronic Rights Management and Digital Identifier Systems, 4 J. Elec. Pub. (1999), at
http://www.press.umich.edu/jep/04- 03/gervais.html:
The content is there. In almost all cases, it is in digital form or can be digitized. Networks with
sufficient bandwidth are being built, and many business users and individual consumers are already
connected. They are ready for the content. Many copyright industries and other rights holders are
coming to the view that global networks represent good business opportunities and that digital, though
it may be different, is nonetheless interesting commercially. In fact, it may be the only future growth
area. To put it simply, digital is inevitable.
Id. (report presented to WIPO (Geneva) in December 1998).
8
See Daniel Gervais, Copyright and eCommerce, in Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace (Melvin
Simensky et al. eds., 2001 Supp., 2002).
9
I am thinking here mainly of the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI), a project that has been put on the
back burner. On the project's site, www.sdmi.org, as of November 2003, is the following: "As of May 18, 2001
SDMI is on hiatus, and intends to re-assess technological advances at some later date."
10
For example, the famous suit against Napster. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001). See Michael S. Elkin & Alexandra Khlyavich, Napster Near and Far: Will the Ninth Circuit's Ruling
Affect Secondary Infringement in the Outer Reaches of Cyberspace?, 27 Brook. J. Int'l L. 381 (2002)
(discussing the findings in and the impact of the Napster case); Sarah H. McWane, Hollywood vs. Silicon
Valley: DeCSS Down, Napster to Go?, 9 CommLaw Conspectus 87 (2001)(arguing that "[t]he recording
industry holds stubbornly to the retailing model where people are actually purchasing CDs when, in reality,
people are now downloading MP3s").
11
For example, the iTunes.com site belonging to Apple Computers, became an overnight success in spite of the
fact that originally it only worked with Macintosh computers using the latest version (OS10) of the operating
system. See Neill Strauss, Apple Finds a Route For Online Music Sales, N.Y. Times, May 29, 2003, at E1; see
also Press Release, Apple Computers, One Million Copies of iTunes for Windows Software Downloaded in
Three and a Half Days: One Million Songs Purchased by iTunes Users in Three and a Half Days (Oct. 20,
2003), available at http:// www.apple.com/pr/library/2003/oct/20itunes.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2005).
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The main concern of most industries seems to be to avoid any reuse of the
downloaded content. This is precisely where the problem of adaptability of copyright
to the digital world is most obvious.
This paper argues that it is time to replace the existing set of copyright rights by
focusing on its true policy objectives. The paper thus begins with a brief look at the
history of copyright and tries to identify what is wrong with extant norms. In other
words, the spotlight will be on the apparent chasm between the policy objectives and
the norms. The paper will then suggest that a new international copyright norm could
be created based on the Berne Convention's three-step test, in harmony with the U.S.
fair use doctrine. 12
I. A Brief History of Copyright
The first copyright statute 13 in the United Kingdom 14 was essentially a privilege
granted by the Crown to authors and publishers to prevent reuse by other publishers.
It seems to have been derived from a

12

Use will be considered fair (and consequently non-infringing) according to the four following criteria:
(1)the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2)the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2005).
13
Prior to the Statute of Anne (infra note 14), there had been no copyright proper. Artists in classical Greece
and the Roman Empire did not seek personal attribution, and it was common to identify someone else, a teacher
or a famous person, as the "author." During the early and middle Middle Ages, approximately from the eighth
to the twelfth century, almost all artistic works were created in Europe under the patronage of the Roman
Catholic Church, which became de facto the owner of all "works." Michelangelo was one of the first artists
under Church patronage to insist on personal attribution. The insistence of the personal role of the author and
the recognition of the link between authors and works is mostly a child of the Enlightenment, with, for example,
Kant's and later Hegel's view that the author infused his or her will into the work. See Dan Rosen, Artists'
Moral Rights: A European Evolution, An American Revolution, 2 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 155 (1983); Harold
C. Streibich, The Moral Right of Ownership to Intellectual Property: Part I - From the Beginning to the Age of
Printing, 6 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 1 (1975); Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural
Heritage: A Comparison of Droit Moral Between France and the United States, 22 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts
361 (1998).
14
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
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previous act designed to limit publications to authorized publishers. 15 In other
words, it was a "professional right," used mostly by professionals against other
professionals: certain commercial entities waited to see which books were selling well
and then started to copy them. This created a free-rider system, which was rather
inefficient from a commercial standpoint: publishers had little incentive to invest in
the publication of new books and authors were suffering from the narrow bandwidth
for the dissemination of their books. This "free" and rather raw capitalism thus led to
a market failure in the book trade that had to be regulated.
On the Continent things were taking a different route. While events paralleled those
in the United Kingdom (there were printing privileges in Italy and pre-Revolution
France since at least the early seventeenth century) for several decades, things took a
different turn at the end of the eighteenth century: authors' rights were born in the
purest tradition of human rights, that is, as natural rights. As such, they had special
status and could not easily be limited by the State, politically or legally.
But here again the rights were exercised mostly against infringers who were, by and
large, either small-time pirates, or professionals lacking a certain ethical view of
publishing. Truth be told, the boundary between authorized reuse of existing material
and infringement was not and is not always clear. Authors were also able to use their
new human right against publishers who exploited them beyond what they considered
to be an acceptable limit.
The history of copyright and authors' rights in the decades that follow is essentially
that of an adaptation to new forms of creation (for example, cinema) and, more
importantly, of new ways to disseminate copyrighted works (radio, then television
broadcasting, cable, and satellite). The result is a bundle composed of "copyright
rights," a list of specific rights in respect of particular forms of exploitation of works
(reproduction, public performance or communication to the public, and adaptation).
It is important to add, however, that from the eighteenth century until the 1990s,
those copyright rights were aimed at, and used against professional entities, either
legitimate entities such as broadcasters, cable companies or distributors; or
illegitimate ones such as cassette and compact disk pirates. In most cases, these
professionals were
15

See L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders' View of the
Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 Emory L.J.
909, 916 (2003).
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intermediaries with no interest in the content itself (that is, they could have sold shoes
instead of movies). Their job was to get content to end-users, most of whom were
consumers and of no interest to copyright law or lawyers.
A fundamental shift has occurred since digital technology and especially the
Internet: copyright is now a legal tool that rightsholders can use against end-users,
including consumers. 16 Rightsholders want to use the copyright tools at their
disposal for a dual purpose: ensuring that end-users pay the fee for the material they
use (which they see as including getting access through authorized sources), and
preventing the transmission of the material by those end-users to other users (in other
words preventing them from becoming intermediaries). To put it bluntly,
rightsholders want to ensure that end-users remain just that, end-users.
Individual users, on the other hand, want to harness the enormous capabilities of the
Internet to access, use, and disseminate information and content. The demand is huge
and ever increasing. Internet technology has responded to this huge pull not only by
providing the initial adequate technological means, but by responding to legal barriers
by providing new ones: close Napster and peer-to-peer emerges. Try to shut peer-topeer down, as was done in the recent wave of subpoenas and law suits against
individual file sharers, 17 and quite predictably, another technology will surface:
anonymous file exchange systems, thus defeating any subpoena served on the internet
service provider (ISP). 18 Because ISPs will not know the identity of users who are
exchanging music files, subpoenas will be ineffective. In a similar vein, if a way is

16

See Press Release, Recording Industry Association of America, Recording Industry Begins Suing P2P File
Sharers Who Illegally Offer Copyrighted Music Online (Sept. 8, 2003), available at http://
www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/090803.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2005); see also John Borland, RIAA Sues 261
File Swappers, CNET News.com, available at http:// news.com.com/2100-1023-5072564.html?tag=nl (last
visited Oct. 2, 2004); John Borland, RIAA files 80 New File-Swapping Suits, CNET News.com, available at
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5099738.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
17
See sources cited supra note 16.
18
See In re Verizon Internet Servs., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003). CNET reported the increasing use of
proxies to ensure the anonymity of file-sharers. See John Borland, Covering Tracks: New Privacy Hope for
P2P, CNET News, Feb. 24, 2004, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1027- 5164413.html (last visited Oct.
2, 2004). Another example is a program created by Wyatt Wasicek, called AnonX, that masks the Internet
address of people who use file-sharing programs such as Kazaa. Wasicek promises not to divulge his 7,000
users' Internet addresses, and believes he cannot be forced to do so. See Angry with RIAA Tactics, Programmer
Creates Mask for File-sharers, http:// www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/editorial/7927993.htm
(last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
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found to block music files, software that disguises the music content will be invented.
19
In short, users seem poised to win this war and commentators are already saying
that the music industry will be lucky to be around to lick its wounds.
The best way forward for the music industry is to completely redefine old business
models based on albums, physical copies (CDs) and, more importantly, the
abandonment of the scarcity paradigm. Information is not valuable on the Internet
because it is scarce; it is valuable because it is found.
The commercial and public relations cost of trying to apply copyright to end-users
illustrates a simple fact: it is not what copyright was meant to do. The history and
underlying policy objectives of copyright indicate that it is a right to be exercised by
and against professionals. One should add to this equation the fact that copyright was
always used to regulate and organize markets when a new form of dissemination was
invented. The Internet, from this perspective, is probably the biggest jump in
technological terms and copyright was used not to organize the music market but
rather to deny it. That will not work. Copyright is not a dam, it is a river. 20 It was
always used to channel use and optimize exploitation, not to entirely shut out a new
medium.
Following the same train of thought, exceptions and limitations to copyright were
also mostly written in the days of the professional intermediary as user. This explains
why in several national laws, the main exceptions can be grouped into two categories:
private use, which governments previously regarded as "unregulatable" and where
copyright law abdicated its authority by nature; and use by specific professional
intermediaries: libraries (and archives) and certain public institutions, including
schools, courts and sometimes the government itself. There are still today several
very broad exceptions for "private use," for example Italy and Japan, that were
adopted in the days when the end-user was just that, the end of the distribution chain.
19

Regularly, new technologies that promise to stop P2P sharing of copyrighted material (such as Audible
Magic) emerge, usually with some concerns about privacy. See John Borland, File-swap 'Killer' Grabs
Attention, CNET News, Mar. 3, 2004, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1025_3-5168505.html (last
visited Oct. 9, 2003).
20
The successes of publishers of scientific and medical journals show that using copyright norms in the Internet
environment is possible. By making journals available online and leveraging the technology to provide, for
example, raw lab data or files containing three-dimensional images, those publishers, who still sell plenty of
paper copies, have increased total revenues. The key is to trust users and let them use the material. Trust was
always implicit in pre-Internet days, with legal devices such as the first-sale doctrine, private copying
exceptions, fair use, etc.
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The result of those exceptions expressed, in a U.S. context, as a combination of fair
use and the first-sale doctrine, 21 meant that end-users were trusted by the copyright
industries. 22 Users enjoyed both "room to move," because of exceptions such as fair
use, and rights stemming from their ownership of a physical copy. 23
The fact that private use is not expressly mentioned as an exception in a number of
national laws or the Berne Convention is not surprising: it was of little interest to
copyright holders until the invention of the VCR and double-deck cassette players,
which only became popular in the 1970s. A number of countries then introduced
regulation not to stop the practice (and there were famous court cases where this was
tried, including the Sony case in the United States), 24 but rather to compensate
rightsholders by introducing levies on blank tapes and, in certain cases, on recording
equipment as well. 25 The inapplicability of analog *

21

See R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 577 (2003).
For at least ninety-five years, the first sale doctrine in U.S. copyright law has allowed those who buy
copies of a copyrighted work to resell, rent, or lend those copies. Copyright law is often viewed as a
balance of providing authors with sufficient incentives to create their works and maximizing public
access to those works. And the first sale doctrine has been a major bulwark in providing public access
by facilitating the existence of used book and record stores, video rental stores, and, perhaps most
significantly, public libraries.
Id. at 577.
22
Not that they liked it. The battle against the VCR is a good example. Of course, today video sales and rentals
generate a substantial chunk of change for the film industry.
23
The Canadian Supreme Court in the 2002 case of Théberge v. Galeries d'art du Petit Champlain, Inc., [2002]
SCC 34, wrote an interesting comment on this point:
Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of intellectual property may unduly limit
the ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the long-term
interests of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to proper utilization. This is reflected in
the exceptions to copyright . . . such as fair dealing . . . .
...
This case demonstrates the basic economic conflict between the holder of the intellectual property in
a work and the owner of the tangible property that embodies the copyrighted expressions.
Id. (emphasis added).
24
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
25
P. Bernt Hugenholtz et al., The Future of Levies in a Digital Environment, Inst. for Info. L. 9 (2003),
available at http:// www.ivir.nl/publications/other/DRM&levies-report.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
Historically, copyright levy systems have been premised on the assumption that certain uses, especially private
copying, of protected works cannot be controlled and exploited individually. With the advent of digital rights
management (DRM) this assumption must be re-examined. . . . Where such individual rights management is
available there would appear to remain no need, and no justification, for mandatory levy systems. Id.
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exceptions to the Internet is illustrated by the debate concerning section 110(2) of the
U.S. Copyright Act. It contains limitations on the nature and content of the
transmission, and the identity and location of the recipients. As was noted by the
United States Register of Copyrights in her May 1999 Report on Copyright and
Digital Distance Education: 26
As written, section 110(2) has only limited application to courses offered over a
digital network. Because it exempts only acts of performance or display, it would not
authorize the acts of reproduction or distribution involved in this type of digital
transmission. In addition, students who choose to take a distance course without
special circumstances that prevent their attendance in classrooms may not qualify as
eligible recipients. 27
Quite logically, the report recommends that updating section 110(2) "to allow the
same activities to take place using digital delivery mechanisms, while controlling the
risks involved, would continue the basic policy balance struck in 1976." 28 Such an
adaptation of 15 U.S.C. section 110(2) is possible because it still applies to
professional users, namely educators. In the case of individual users, the
rightsholder's unwillingness to trust those users and the need to technologically
enforce legal and/or contractual use restrictions has led not only to a refusal to
consider new exceptions but, in fact, to efforts to radically reduce any room to move
left for those users. 29

26

Marybeth Peters, Report on Copyright and Digital Distance Education, U.S. Copyright Office, (1999),
available at http:// www.copyright.gov/reports/de_rprt.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
27
Id. at vii-viii.
28
Id. at xv.
29
The image of "fared use" has been mentioned in this connection. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use:
The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 557, 559
(1998).
[Automated rights management (ARM)] enables information providers to enforce standard copyright
claims mechanically, without resort to the threat of litigation. It also allows copyright owners and
others to create and enforce contracts that specify other sets of rights. Although ARM may give
information providers newfound power to control the use of their wares, it does not necessarily justify
that control. The proper legal response to ARM thus remains an open--and vital--question. ARM
portends far-reaching and unprecedented effects on rights to information in the new digital intermedia.
Specifically, ARM threatens to reduce radically the scope of the fair use defense to copyright
infringement. ARM will interact with existing legal doctrines to supplant fair use with an analogous
but distinctly different doctrine: fared use.
Id.
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II. The "Problem with Copyright"
Is the copyright deer stuck in policy headlights? To a certain extent, the answer is
yes, but only if one tries to fit too much into the copyright house. Copyright was, as a
regulatory vehicle, a way to maintain the necessary level of scarcity among
professionals who create, publish and disseminate material embodying human
intellectual creativity so as to allow the development of an organized marketplace. In
other words, copyright works well as a regulation of commercial intercourse. Extant
exceptions to copyright protection discussed above show that it is not well adapted to,
and was not meant to control, private use by individuals.
The problem stems in large part from the way copyright rights were expressed, in
turn a direct reflection of its history. From its very beginning, in the 1710 Statute of
Anne, 30 where copyright was presented as a way to promote the creation and
dissemination of new works by protecting publishers from free-riding by other
publishers, to today's copyright legislation and international treaties, including the
Berne Convention 31 and Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) Agreement, 32 copyright has been expressed in terms of rights attaching to
the nature of the use, not to its effect. In other words, rights have been granted with
respect to acts of reproduction, performance, and adaptation. But was this ever the
true focus of copyright policy? I suggest that its actual target was commercial use and
reuse and the prevention of free-riding by competitors, including, of course, true
commercial pirates. 33
30

See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Paris July 24,
1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
32
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 3,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
33
The comment is limited to the so-called economic rights. Interestingly, where moral rights exist, a case can
be made that (a) the test is not nature but effect and (b) the rationale is partly non commercial. First, the
standard test for the right of integrity is, as expressed in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, a right to oppose
"any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which
would be prejudicial to [the author's] honor or reputation." The nature of the act clause in this Article, namely
"distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or derogatory action in relation to" is very broad, so broad in
fact as to become a non condition. The real test is the effect of the act, i.e., the prejudice to the author's honor or
reputation. The rationale of this right is partly commercial (maintaining the integrity of the work) as is the
rationale for the right to claim authorship, the other part of the 6bis rights (ensuring that the source is
acknowledged). But part of the rationale stems, historically, from an eighteenth century civil law worldview
that saw a permanent tether between the author and her creation, independently of any transfer of the work (as
an object) and/or intellectual property rights therein.
31
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The time is ripe to abandon this legislative approach based on the nature of the act of
use and focus instead on its effect. Is that not, after all, what rightsholders care about?
What the rightsholder in a film wants is to control and presumably be paid for the
broadcasting of the film, not the number of transient, ephemeral, other reproductions
made, or the fact that the work is performed, communicated or transmitted by
Hertzian waves, wire, wireless networks or otherwise. Rightsholders care about such
distinctions to the extent that they represent or affect markets. Otherwise, the
technical requirements for the use of their content are irrelevant. Professional users
similarly want to be authorized to perform commercial operations, (for example, a
certain form of broadcasting at a certain date) independently of what the actual
technical requirements are for this operation to be successfully performed. Yet, today
copyright focuses instead only on the technical nature of the use.
Exceptions in many national laws for ephemeral recordings are a powerful symptom
of the malaise. Broadcasting usually requires temporary copies to be made. Because
the real act to be considered is the broadcasting, not the temporary copying, many
legislators opted to exempt the act of copying from copyright infringement liability.
Otherwise, the user's need for an authorization would have been compounded by the
fact that the various fragments of the copyright bundle (reproduction, public
performance in various forms and media) may very well be owned by different
rightsholders, thus requiring multiple authorizations for a single economic operation.
34

This poses new problems in the Internet environment, where most acts of use have a
dual nature from a copyright law standpoint. Any content made available on a server
is usually reproduced and performed/communicated. To make matters worse, in
implementing the 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Treaties, 35

34

See Daniel Gervais & Alana Maurushat, Fragmented Copyright, Fragmented Management: Proposals to
Defrag Copyright Management, 2 Can. J. of L. & Tech. 15 (2003).
35
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36
I.L.M. 65 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty]; World Intellectual Property Organisation Performances
and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty].
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certain countries have introduced a new right or fragment, usually called the "making
available" right. 36 A single economic operation in that context may require three or
more separate authorizations, possibly leading to over- or split payments (because
often each rightsholder will want to be paid for the entire economic value of the
operation) and almost certainly to high if not insurmountable rights clearance
processes and transaction costs.
The "problem with copyright" was illustrated in the U.S. case, Eldred v. Ashcroft. 37
While ostensibly the plaintiff was trying to obtain a declaration of unconstitutionality
of the extension of the term of copyright protection, I would argue that a proper
rescoping of the right, or more precisely the replacement of the nature of the
prohibition(s) it purports to effectuate, would eliminate a significant portion of the
criticisms leveled at copyright law, especially in respect of its chilling effect, 38 its
impact on the public domain, and its ability to use material to create new works. 39 In
other words, a properly defined set of copyright norms would make the negative
impact of its duration much less significant.
To abandon the nature of the act approach in favor of an effects-based test is not
only possible but, I submit, encouraged by both the main international treaties and
national legislation, at least in the

36

See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 35, art. 8.
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 11(1)(ii), 11bis(1)(i) and (ii), 11ter(1)(ii), 14(1)(ii)
and 14bis(1) of the Berne Convention, authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive
right of authorizing any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means,
including the making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public
may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.
Id. See also WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 35, arts. 8, 10, 12, 14 & 19; Japan's
copyright legislation: Copyright Law, Law No. 48 of 1970, as amended, art. 18.
37
537 U.S. 186.
38
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283 (1996); see also
Lawrence Lessig, Protecting Mickey Mouse at Art's Expense, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2003, at A17 ("Still, missing
from the opinion was any justification for perhaps the most damaging part of Congress's decision to extend
existing copyrights for 20 years: the extension unnecessarily stifles freedom of expression by preventing the
artistic and educational use even of content that no longer has any commercial value."); Brief of Intellectual
Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618, available at
http:// cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/amici/ip-lawprofs.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004).
39
An interesting but somewhat different analysis was proposed by Professor Wagner on this question. See R.
Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 Colum.
L. Rev. 995 (2003).
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United States. This requires us to take a brief look at the types of exceptions currently
in existence.
III. Comparative and International Analysis of Exceptions to Copyright
Our analysis of the different nature of exceptions to copyright rights will consider
first the Berne Convention, and especially the "three-step test," which will be the basis
of our suggested new core norm. I will also examine briefly the most relevant
European Union Directive and then consider the four main models of exceptions and
limitations contained in national copyright laws.
A. The Berne Convention
The Berne Convention contains a general rule, known as the "three-step test," which
guides national legislators but only with respect to the right of reproduction. 40 It may
be useful to recall that the so-called three-step-test allows exceptions to the
reproduction right: 1) in certain special cases; 2) that do not conflict with the normal
commercial exploitation of the work; and 3) do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the author. 41
B. Analysis of the Three-Step Test
The three-step test has become the cornerstone for almost all exceptions to all
intellectual property rights at the international level. It has been used as the model for
exceptions to all copyright rights in the TRIPS Agreement 42 (Article 13), to the rights
created by the WIPO Copyright Treaty 43 (Article 10), and the WIPO Performances
and
40

See Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis 144-47 (2d ed. 2003); Mihály
Fiscor, How Much of What? The Three-Step Test and Its Application in Two Recent WTO Dispute Settlement
Cases, 192 Revue internationale du droit d'auteur 111, 231-42 (2002).
41
Berne Convention, supra note 31.
42
The TRIPS Agreement also contains a list of material excluded for copyrightability (Article 9(2)), namely
"ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such." It also extended in its Article 13
the three-step test of the Berne Convention to cover any copyright right (including, for example, public
performance).
43
This treaty was implemented in the United States by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) [hereinafter DMCA]. The WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms
Treaties Implementation Act of 1998 is title I of the DMCA. The treaty has at least two interesting features for
our purposes, namely the application of the three-step test in its Article 10 and the following declaration in its
preamble: "Recognizing the need to maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the larger public
interest, particularly education, research and access to information, as reflected in the Berne Convention."
WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 35, preamble.
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Phonograms Treaty (Article 16). Interestingly, in the TRIPS Agreement, it is also the
basis for exceptions to industrial design protection (Article 26(2)), and patent rights
(Article 30). There is, however, a crucial difference in the case of patent rights: The
last (third) step of the test [does] not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties." 44
1. "Certain Special Cases"
In his seminal book on the Berne Convention, 45 Professor Sam Ricketson opines
that "special" means that the exception must have a purpose and be justified by public
policy. 46 This purpose-oriented or teleological interpretation of the Convention is
reinforced by the use of the phrase "to the extent justified by the purpose" in Articles
10(1) and 10(2) (which allow exceptions to be made for quotation and teaching), and
Article 10bis(2) (which allows reporting of current events). 47 The purpose of public
information is clearly the basis for the latter exception and for the possible exclusion
from copyright of certain official texts.
In the 2001 WTO panel decision concerning section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright
Act, 48 the first part of the three-step test, namely the meaning of "special," was
interpreted for the first time by an international tribunal. The approach taken was to
first politely exclude Ricketson's view 49 and essentially to look at the Oxford
dictionary: 50
The term "special" connotes "having an individual or limited application or
purpose", "containing details; precise, specific", "exceptional in quality or degree;
unusual; out of the ordinary" or "distinctive in some way" [here was a footnote
referring to the Oxford dictionary]. This term means that more is needed than a clear
definition in order to meet the standard of the first

44

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 32, art. 30 (emphasis added). I am indebted to Dr. Mihály Ficsor, who shared
his views on the WTO panel decision dealing with § 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act. See Mihály, supra note
40.
45
Sam Ricketson, The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886-1986 (1987).
46
Id. at 482.
47
Berne Convention, supra note 31, arts. 10(1), 10(2), 10bis(2)
48
United States - Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act: Report of the Panel, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000)
[hereinafter Panel Report].
49
Id. n.114.
50
Id. PP 6.108-6.110.
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condition. In addition, an exception or limitation must be limited in its field of
application or exceptional in its scope. In other words, an exception or limitation
should be narrow in quantitative as well as a qualitative sense. 51
The approach chosen by the panel is understandable. For valid policy reasons, 52 the
WTO Appellate Body has preferred to stick with the ordinary meaning of words, in
part to avoid introducing unbargained for concessions in the WTO legal framework. 53
In the section 110(5) case, however, there were two problems with this approach.
First, Ricketson's "view" was solidly anchored in the history and the text of the
Convention. Second, the logic of the WTO panel's reasoning is incomplete. How
helpful is it, from a legal standpoint, to say that "special" means either "limited in its
field of application or exceptional in its scope" ? 54 The former criterion is not very
restrictive; the second clearly is. More importantly, the last sentence of the above
quote from the case does not logically follow from what precedes. It is not because
an exception must be "limited in its field of application" that one can conclude that it
must therefore be "narrow in quantitative as well as a qualitative sense." 55 This is a
huge logical jump which in fact elevates the threshold of acceptable exceptions under
the Berne Convention.
I previously argued 56 that the three-step test in really a two-step test and that little
time should be spent on finding the proper meaning of "special." Indeed, if the
meaning of "special" as used in Article 13 of TRIPS and Article 9(2) of the Berne
Convention is that there should be a sound policy justification, few countries will act
in a purely arbitrary way. In addition, WTO panels should not try to step into the
shoes of national policy makers. If its meaning is that the exception should somehow
be circumscribed, all exceptions should fit the mold. Indeed, while the "dictionary
approach" seems a much safer alternative for WTO panels in most cases, in the
section 110(5) case it was mostly useless. Any exception to copyright is arguably
"special" because any
51

Id. P 6.109.
Essentially, that trade-agreements are bargained for and should not, therefore, be "completed" or amended by
interpretation. See, e.g., Word trade Organization Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996). The Appellate Body stated that
"applying the basic principle of interpretation that the words of a treaty, like the General Agreement, are to be
given their ordinary meaning, in their context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose." Id.
53
See Gervais, supra note 40, at 146.
54
Panel Report, supra note 48, P 6.109.
55
Id.
56
See id.
52
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exception short of a complete repeal of the Copyright Act would arguably be "limited
in its field of application." 57 Indeed, at the 1967 Stockholm Conference, this first
step was really a last filter:
If it is considered that reproduction 58 conflicts with the normal exploitation of the
work, reproduction is not permitted at all. If it is considered that reproduction does
not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work, the next step would be to
consider whether it does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author. Only if such is not the case would it be possible in certain special cases to
introduce a compulsory license, or to provide for use without payment. 59
The two steps in the test that can truly be operationalized are thus the "interference
with commercial exploitation" and the "unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate
interests of the author."
2. Interference With Normal Commercial Exploitation
What is the meaning of "exploitation" in the context of this second step of the test?
It seems fairly straightforward: any use of the work by which the copyright owner
tries to extract or maximize the value of her right. Normal is more troublesome.
Does it refer to what is simply common or does it refer to a normative standard? The
question is relevant in particular for new forms and emerging business models which
have not thus far been common or normal in an empirical sense. During the last
substantive revision of the Berne Convention in Stockholm in 1968, the concept was
clearly used to refer to "all forms of exploiting a work which had, or were likely to
acquire, considerable economic or practical importance." 60 As Professor Goldstein
noted, the purpose of the second step is to "fortify authors' interests in their
accustomed markets against local legislative inroads." 61 It thus seems that the
condition is normative in nature: an exception is not allowed if it covers any form of
exploitation which has, or is likely to acquire, considerable importance. In other
words, if the exception is used to
57

Id.
This quote relates to the three-step test contained in Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, where it only
applies to the right of reproduction. In Article 13 of TRIPS, it was extended to all copyright rights.
59
Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, June 11 to July 14, 1967, WIPO, Geneva, at
1145 (1971) [hereinafter Records of the Stockholm Conference].
60
Id. at 112.
61
Paul Goldstein, International Copyright, 295 (2001). See also M. Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the
Internet, 516 (2002).
58
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limit a commercially significant market or, a fortiori, to enter into competition with
the copyright holder, the exception is prohibited. 62
We can, therefore, agree with the WTO panel on this point. It concluded as follows:
[I]t appears that one way of measuring the normative connotation of normal
exploitation is to consider, in addition to those forms of exploitation that currently
generate significant or tangible revenue, those forms of exploitation which, with a
certain degree of likelihood and plausibility, could acquire considerable economic or
practical importance. 63
3. Unreasonable Prejudice to Legitimate Interests of Rightsholder
The third step is perhaps the most difficult. What is an "unreasonable prejudice,"
and what are "legitimate interests" ?
Let us start with "legitimate." "It can have two meanings: (a) conformable to,
sanctioned or authorized by, law or principle; lawful, justifiable; proper; or (b)
normal; regular; conformable to a recognized type." 64 To put it differently, are
legitimate interests only legal interests? I do not believe so. I suggest that the third
step is the clearest indication of the need to balance the rights of copyright holders
and users anywhere in the Berne Convention. 65 An analysis of the Records
62

One could see the scope of an exception based on non commercially significant use in House Report 3261 of
the 108th Congress known as the Act to Prohibit the Misappropriation of Certain Databases, § 4(b) of which
would allow the
making available in commerce of a substantial part of a database by a nonprofit educational,
scientific, and research institution, including an employee or agent of such institution acting within the
scope of such employment or agency, for nonprofit educational, scientific, and research purposes
....
. . . if the court determines that the making available in commerce of the information in the database
is reasonable under the circumstances, taking into consideration the customary practices associated
with such uses of such database by nonprofit educational, scientific, or research institutions and other
factors that the court determines relevant.
H.R. 3261, 108th Cong. (2003).
63
Panel Report, supra note 48, P 6.180.
64
Id. P6.180.
65
See Martin Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step-Test 226-27 (2004).
Copyright law is centered round the delicate balance between rants and reservations. On one side of
this balance, the economic and non-economic interests of authors of already existing works can be
found. On the other side, the interests of users--a group encompassing authors wishing to build upon
the work of their predecessors--are located. If a proper balance between the concerns of authors and
users is to be struck, both sides must necessarily take a step towards the center. The two elements of
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of the Stockholm Conference shows that the United Kingdom took the view that
legitimate meant simply "sanctioned by law," while other countries seems to take a
broader view, meaning "justifiable" in the sense that they are supported by social
norms and relevant public policies. 66 In my view, and it seems to be the approach
taken by the WTO panel, 67 the combination of the notion of "prejudice" with that of
"interests" points quite clearly towards a legal-normative approach. In other words,
"legitimate interests" are those that are protected by law. The interpretation might be
different if the third step of the test was formulated as "the reproduction not contrary
to the legitimate interests of the author." With the unreasonable prejudice element,
however, the legitimate interests are almost by definition legal interests.
This leaves open one key question: what does "unreasonable prejudice" mean. 68
Clearly, the word "unreasonable" indicates that some level or degree of prejudice is
justified. For example, while a country might exempt the making of a small number
of private copies entirely, it may be required to impose a compensation scheme, such
as a levy, when the prejudice level becomes unjustified. 69 To buttress this view, the
French version of the Berne Convention, which governs in case of a discrepancy, 70
uses the expression "préjudice injustifié," which one would translate literally as
"unjustified prejudice." The translators opted instead for "not unreasonable." 71
I would suggest that the inclusion of a reasonableness or justifiability criterion is a
key that allows legislators to establish a balance between,

the third criterion (legitimate interests and unreasonable prejudice) mirror these two steps. The authors
cannot assert each and every concern. Instead, only legitimate interests are relevant. As a
countermove, the users recognise that copyright limitations in their favour must keep within reasonable
limits.
Id.
See Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note 59.
67
Panel Report, supra note 48, PP 6.223-6.229. At paragraph 6.224 the panel somehow tried to reconcile the
two approaches: "the term relates to lawfulness from a legal positivist perspective, but it has also the
connotation of legitimacy from a more normative perspective, in the context of calling for the protection of
interests that are justifiable in the light of the objectives that underlie the protection of exclusive rights."
68
It is worth noting that "not unreasonable prejudice" is not quite the same as "reasonable prejudice." "Not
unreasonable" connotes a slightly stricter threshold. See Panel Report, supra note 48, P 6.225.
69
Reports of the Five Main Committees of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm 7, 26-27 (1967).
70
Berne Convention, supra note 31, art. 31.
71
Records of the Stockholm Conference, supra note 59, § 84, at 1145 .
66
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on the one hand, the rights of authors and other copyright holders and the needs and
interests of users, on the other. This seems even clearer when the French term
("unjustified") is used. In other words, there must be a public interest justification to
limit copyright.
As a result, it is not easy to agree with the WTO panel, which essentially conflated
the second and third steps when it concluded that "prejudice to the legitimate interests
of right holders reaches an unreasonable level if an exception or limitation causes or
has the potential to cause an unreasonable loss of income to the copyright owner." 72
A public interest imperative may lead a government to impose an exception to
copyright that may translate into a loss of revenue for copyright holders. It can
nonetheless be "justified." In addition, by focusing on economic harm, the panel may
have considerably expanded the scope of exceptions: it is not the fact that a user
obtained some value that is determinative, but rather the fact that a rightsholder can
show that it lost actual value (revenue), that is, the existence of a prejudice. This view
is reinforced by the arbitration decision and the fact that non-implementation leads to
a determination of the level of harm suffered. 73
Let us look at national and regional legislation to determine the parameters of
exceptions to copyright.
C. European "InfoSoc" Directive
The European Union's Information Society (InfoSoc) Directive 74 contains two sets
of exceptions. The first, and only mandatory,
72

Panel Report, supra note 48, P 6.229.
Under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) that governs the WTO dispute-settlement process, a
party may ask for arbitration if another party fails to implement an adopted panel (or Appellate Body) decision.
Because the United States failed to implement the Panel report (which is still true as of March 2004--the WTO
had ordered the United States to bring the exemption in line with the Panel's ruling by July 27, 2001), the
European Union asked for arbitration and decision on the level of harm, which was determined to be $1.1
million per year. The European Union has proposed levying a fee on copyrighted material against U.S.
nationals unless the United States reforms its law. See World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Panel on
United States--Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/22 (Mar. 1, 2002); World Trade
Organization Dispute Settlement Panel on United States--Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,
WT/DS160/12 (Feb. 19, 2002); World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Panel on United States-- Section
110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/19 (Jan. 11, 2002); World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement
Panel on United States--Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/12 (Jan. 15, 2001).
74
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation
of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society [hereinafter Directive].
73
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exception is for transient copies "forming an integral and essential part of a
technological process." 75 Otherwise, the Directive contains an exhaustive list of
permitted exceptions (that is, exceptions that EU member States may choose to use in
their national copyright legislation). 76 These are all purpose-specific exceptions.
There is no set of criteria comparable to the U.S. fair use doctrine. 77
However, the preamble to this Directive, which serves as a guideline for the
interpretation of the operative part of the text, 78 refers to permitting "exceptions or
limitations in the public interest for the purpose of education and teaching" and to the
need to safeguard a "fair balance of rights and interests between the different
categories of rightsholders, as well as between the different categories of rightsholders
and users" through exceptions and limitations, which "have to be reassessed in the
light of the new electronic environment." 79
Otherwise, the Directive also refers to the three-step test as an overarching test for
all permitted exceptions. Chapter III Article 5(5) reads:
The exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall only
be applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of
the work or other subject matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the rightholder. 80
Interestingly, the reference to the test is seen as a "guiding principle" rather than an
effective means to effectively harmonize exceptions in the national laws of the 25 EU
member States. 81 Indeed, at the level of national laws, the three-step test could be
refined by enumerating certain specific cases, 82 or by providing additional guidance
on the
75

Id. ch. III, art. 5(1).
Id.
77
As embodied in 17 U.S.C. § 107. See supra note 12.
78
Directive, supra note 74.
79
Id.
80
Id. ch. III, art. 5(5).
81
See M. Senftleben, supra note 65, at 246-48.
82
See P.B. Hugenholtz, Why the Copyright Directive Is Unimportant, and Possibly Invalid, 22 Eur. Intell. Prop.
Rev. 499, 501 (2000).
What makes the Directive a total failure, in terms of harmonization, is that the exemptions allowed
under Article 5 are optional, not mandatory (except for 5.1). Member States are not obliged to
implement the entire list, but may pick and choose at will. It is expected that most Member States will
prefer to keep intact their national laws as much as possible. At best, some countries will add one or
two exemptions from the list, now bearing the E.C.'s seal of approval. So much for approximation!
Id.
76
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interpretation of the three steps. It remains a flexible test which could, however, be
used by courts in cases where no such specific exception exists, if allowed to do so
under domestic law.
D. National Laws
Exceptions in national copyright laws can be grouped under four main headings.
The first, I reserve for fair use 83 and do not need to belabor its content here.
1. Fair Dealing
A second category is the fair dealing approach of other common law countries,
generally modeled after the U.K. Copyright Act of 1911. 84 These consist of a list of
situations where "dealing" with a protected work is permitted combined with a
requirement that the use be fair in light of the purpose. These specific purposes are
usually related to criticism and review, news reporting, teaching, archives and
libraries, use by visually impaired readers. 85 In a recent Canadian Supreme Court
decision, the research component was interpreted very broadly, apparently covering
even for-profit research. 86 The fairness criterion usually requires that no more of the
work be used than was necessary for the authorized purpose. 87
83

See supra note 12.
Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46 (Eng.)
85
See, e.g., Copyright Act, R.S.C., c. C-42, § § 29-30 (1985) (Can.); Copyright Act 1968, c.63 as amended, § §
40-42 (Austl.); and Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c.48, § § 29-30 (Eng.).
86
CCH v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] SCC 13 (Can).
The fair dealing exception under s. 29 is open to those who can show that their dealings with a
copyrighted work were for the purpose of research or private study. "Research" must be given a large
and liberal interpretation in order to ensure that users' rights are not unduly constrained. I agree with
the Court of Appeal that research is not limited to non-commercial or private contexts.
Id. P 51 (emphasis added).
87
See id.
[T]he following factors [should] be considered in assessing whether a dealing was fair: (1) the
purpose of the dealing; (2) the character of the dealing; (3) the amount of the dealing; (4) alternatives
to the dealing; (5) the nature of the work; and (6) the effect of the dealing on the work. Although these
considerations will not all arise in every case of fair dealing, this list of factors provides a useful
analytical framework to govern determinations of fairness in future cases.
Id. P 53. See also William Cornish & David Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks
and Allied Rights, 440-48 (5th ed. 2003); James Lahore & Warwick A. Rothnie, Copyright and Designs, § §
40.050, 40.065 & 40.115-40.130 (2003); William Patry, The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law, 594-99 (2d
ed. 1995); David Vaver, Copyright Law, § Fair Dealing (2000).
84
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Commonwealth members are not the only countries where fair dealing exists. Israel
has a fair dealing with civil law overtones. According to Section 2(1) of the
Copyright Act, 1911, 88 fair dealing for the purposes of private study, research,
criticism and review, or to make a journalistic summary is allowed. Interestingly,
however, in determining whether a particular dealing was fair, the Israeli Supreme
Court used the U.S. fair use criteria. 89 The "desirable social goal[]" was clearly
mentioned as a relevant criterion. 90 There are additional exceptions for private
recording, 91 public recitation 92 and education, 93 and good faith are considered a
defense against all remedies except injunction. 94
2. Civil Law Enumeration Approach
The third category is that used in most civil law countries, where certain very narrow
uses are allowed without authorization and usually without an express requirement of
fairness. The types of free uses allowed are usually very well defined and limited in
scope. A few national examples may be useful to illustrate the scope of these
exceptions.
In France, the rights of authors are almost sacred. Therefore, exceptions to copyright
are interpreted narrowly and users clearly have no rights following from those
exceptions under copyright law. 95 Exceptions are mostly for private use. 96 In one
case, and then only in an obiter, a French court said it would be prepared to consider a
defense to infringement based on the "public's right to information," which is

88

Copyright Act, 1911, 1 and 2 Geo. 5, ch. 46, (Extension to Palestine) S.R. & O. 1924, No. 385 (U.K.).
See Geva v. Walt Disney Co., P.L.A. 2687/92, 48 P.D.(1) 251, cited in Neil J. Wilkof & Joshua Weisman,
Israel, in International Copyright Law and Practice, ISR-42 & n.47 (M. Nimmer & P. Geller eds., 1991). This
is not far from the six criteria used by the Canadian Supreme Court. See factors listed supra note 87.
90
Wilkof, supra note 89, at ISR-42.
91
Id. at ISR-42 n.44, ISR-43 & n.57, ISR-44 & n.58 (citing Copyright Ordinance, § § 3C-3D). A right to
remuneration is provided. Id. ISR-43.
92
Id. at ISR-42 n.44, ISR-44 & n.59 (citing Copyright Act § 2(1)(VI)).
93
Id. at ISR-42 n.44, ISR-44 & n.61 (citing Copyright Act § 2(1)(IV)).
94
See Wilkof, supra note 89, at ISR-41.
95
See André Lucas & H.-J. Lucas, Traité de la Propriété Littéraire et Artistique 251-54 (2d ed. 2001).
96
Code de la propriété intellectuelle, § L.122-5.
89
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recognized under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 97 There
is also a recognition, in France and Germany, that authors must be granted a certain
freedom to reuse works of other authors and that such "freedom" is normatively at a
higher level than the right of a simple user, in particular a commercial user. 98
The main exception under Dutch copyright law is for private use. 99 It applies to
both reproduction and performance. The private copying exception applies to
companies in the area of press and journal reviews. There is an exception for
quotations, 100 use by government 101 and for public education. 102 Universities
believed they could freely produce "anthologies" or coursepacks for students, but after
losing a court battle in 1986, they made an agreement with the Dutch publishers and
reprography collective. 103 There are also interesting exceptions specific to the field
of fine arts. 104 Article 19 allows "the reproduction of . . . a portrait by or on behalf of
the person portrayed," 105 while under Article 24 "the author of a painting is,
notwithstanding the transfer of his copyright, entitled to make further similar
paintings, unless otherwise agreed." 106
In the Nordic countries, there are exceptions for private reproduction coupled with a
remuneration system (levy), as in section 12(1) of the Swedish Copyright Act. 107
Exceptions are also provided for quotations 108 and use by libraries and archives. 109
The remuneration
97

TGI Toulouse, 3e ch., 26 Sept. 2001, Légipresse 2001, I, 149, cited in André Lucas et al., France, in
International Copyright Law and Practice, at FRA-122 & n.57 (M. Nimmer & P. Geller eds., 1991).
98
In French, known as the "exploitant" (exploiter) of the work--an indication of the mindset. See Alain
Strowel, Droit D'Auteur et Copyright 268 (1993).
99
See Herman Cohen Jehoram, Netherlands, in International Copyright Law and Practice, at NETH-62-NETH69 (M. Nimmer & P. Geller eds., 1991) (citing Copyright Act of § 16).
100
Id. at NETH-71-NETH-72 (citing Copyright Act, art. 15a).
101
Id. at NETH-24 & NETH-64 n.64 (citing Copyright Act, art. 15b).
102
Id. at NETH-70-NETH-71 (citing Copyright Act, art. 16(1)(a)).
103
See President District Court, Rotterdam, 15 Aug. 1986, Informatierecht/AMI 1986/5, 119-121, cited in
Jehoram supra note 99, at NETH-71 & n.90.
104
Jerhoram supra note 99, at NETH-74-NETH-76 (citing Copyright Act arts. 19, 24).
105
Id. at NETH-75.
106
Id. at NETH-74.
107
Gunnar Karnell, Sweden, in International Copyright Law and Practice, at SWE-47 & nn.53-54 (M. Nimmer
& P. Geller eds., 1991) (citing Copyright Act, § 12(1) (originally enacted in 1960 as 1960:729, and as
subsequently amended)).
108
Id. at SWE-48 & n.57 (citing Copyright Act, § 22).
109
Id. at SWE-48 & n.63 (citing Copyright Act, § 16; Copyright Regulation 1993:1212; (latest amendment
1996:865)).
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system for private copying is highly developed in most Nordic countries. For
example Norwegian schools and universities paid 39.06€ per university student and
34.13€ per college students in 2002-2003 just for photocopies. 110
3. Considerations Concerning Private Use
A fourth and final category, which in reality is a subset of the second and third, deals
with private use. However, the rationale is different. Legislators tend to see private
use as uncontrollable, technically, but also from a policy standpoint. 111 In other
words, they are not excluded because of a public interest imperative, but almost as a
practical matter following from the unenforceability of the right. Whether
accompanied by a remuneration on blank media, recording equipment, or both, certain
private uses, usually limited to reproduction and performance for family and friends,
is allowed. Clearly, these exceptions have end-users in mind, because they use works
in ways that, at least pre-Internet, did not interfere with "normal commercial
exploitation" and were, in fact, uncontrollable.
The recent adoption by the European Parliament of a Directive concerning the
enforcement of intellectual property rights is not consonant with this approach and
allows stringent enforcement measures, such as search and seizure of equipment and
other provisional measures against not only professional pirates but also, it seems,
individual end-users, 112 and a right to order the disclosure of the origin of infringing
material. 113 In the case of infringements on a commercial scale, additional measures,
such as seizure of bank accounts, is also provided. 114

110

Kopinor News, New Agreement for Universities and Colleges Concluded, No. 2 vol. 6, Summer 2002. See
http://www.kopinor.no. As of October 31, 2003, the U.S. equivalents were $45.50 and $39.75 respectively.
111
In the sense that enforcement of copyright vis-à-vis individual users was not foreseen. The RIAA (civil) and
Australian (criminal) lawsuits may force us to question the assumption.
112
See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on measures and procedures to
ensure the enforcement of intellectual property rights--Text agreed by the Permanent Representatives
Committee following its meetings on 11 and 13 February 2004 with a view to reaching agreement with the
European Parliament at first reading, EU Council document 6376/04 of 16 February 2004, art. 8 (8 March
2004), available at http:// europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/piracy/.
113
Id. art. 9.
114
Id. art. 10.
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A final type of exception, if that is what it is, is the exhaustion of rights, also known
as the first-sale doctrine. 115 Conceptually, it is very close to the private use
exceptions and is congruent with the idea that end-users should be free to use
lawfully-acquired copies as they wish, but, could also be said to reflect a balance
between the chattel rights of the user and the intellectual property rights of the
copyright owner. This was the approach chosen by the Supreme Court of Canada in a
recent decision. 116 Binnie J., writing the majority opinion, stated:
The proper balance among these and other public policy objectives lies not only in
recognizing the creator's rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature. In
crassly economic terms it would be as inefficient to overcompensate artists and
authors for the right of reproduction as it would be self-defeating to under-compensate
them. Once an authorized copy of a work is sold to a member of the public, it is
generally for the purchaser, not the author, to determine what happens to it. This case
demonstrates the basic economic conflict between the holder of the intellectual
property in a work and the owner of the tangible property that embodies the
copyrighted expressions. 117
E. Application of copyright exceptions to the Internet
Analogue-era exceptions to copyright do not apply easily to the Internet
environment. 118 Let us start with private use. In several countries, blank tape levies
are now imposed on blank digital media. In Greece, the levy was applicable to
personal computers (PCs) 119 and the same could be true of Germany, according to
proposals made by VG WORT, 120 the reprography collective in that country. In
Canada, private copying now applies to CDR, CD audio and, as of February 2004,
also to certain types of removable memory devices. The levy on Apple's

115

See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
Théberge v. Galeries d'art du Petit-Champlain, Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336. The decision was "confirmed" in a
unanimous decision by the same Court in March 2004. See supra note 86.
117
Id. PP 31-33 (emphasis added).
118
See Peters, supra note 26 and accompanying text.
119
But was retroactively cancelled. See Hugenholtz, supra note 25 § 4.2.7, at 30.
120
The full name of the organization is Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort: http://www.vgwort.de. See Press
Release, German Patent Office, Schiedsstelle nach dem Urheberrechtswahrnehmungsgesetz entscheidet über
urheberrechtliche Vergütungspflicht für PCs, (Feb. 6, 2003) at http://
www.dpma.de/infos/pressedienst/pm030206.html. See also Hugenholtz, supra note 25, § 4.2.3, at 26.
116
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iPod and similar devices is now CAN$25 (approximately U.S.$19) per unit. 121
Can a levy on a PC achieve the same "rough justice" purpose 122 as a levy on a blank
audio cassette? There was minimal cross-subsidization in the case of cassettes (few
people recorded sounds other than protected music or their own music), and in
aggregate the measure could be said to be fair because most of the material recorded
was presumably recorded music. Perhaps the same is true of MP3-specific recording
apparatus, but is the same true of CD-Rs? When it comes to PCs, however, clearly
copying recorded music, except for a minority of users, will not be the main activity.
Cross-subsidization thus becomes the rule rather than the exception.
More fundamentally, is it more desirable from a policy standpoint, to regulate
private use in a digital environment than it was in the analogue one? The answer is
multi-faceted. Technical protection measures are now routinely used to limit the type
of private use that one can make with some forms of protected content. The policy
justification is that private use is in fact no longer private because end-users become
intermediaries by re-disseminating the content, such as in peer-to-peer situations. In
addition, current copyright rights focus on various uses of protected material, not their
effects. In that respect, the DMCA 123 probably introduced an entirely different layer
of rights, an access right, which is not linked to the protection of the use of the content
and is independent of whether the use benefits from a license or exception. 124
121

See Tariff of Levies to Be Collected by CPCC in 2003 and 2004 on the Sale of Blank Audio Recording
Media, in Canada, in Respect of the Reproduction for Private Use of Musical Works Embodied in Sound
Recordings, of Performer's Performances of Such Works and of Sound Recordings in Which such Works and
Performances Are Embodied, Decision of the Copyright Board of Canada, Dec. 12, 2003, at 20, available at
http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/decisions/c12122003- b.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
122
See, e.g., Michael Hart, The Copyright in the Information Society Directive: An Overview, 24 Eur. Intell.
Prop. Rev. 58, 60 (2002); see also Conference, Franklin Pierce Law Center's Seventh Biennial Intellectual
Property System Major Problems Conference--Digital Technology and Copyright: A Threat or a Promise?, 39
IDEA 291 (1999).
123
DMCA, supra note 43.
124
The preservation of fair use was given very little regard in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d
429, 458-59 (2d Cir. 2001), aff'g Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y.
2000):
We know of no authority for the proposition that fair use, as protected by the Copyright Act, much
less the Constitution, guarantees copying by the optimum method or in the identical format of the
original. Although the Appellants insisted at oral argument that they should not be relegated to a "horse
and buggy" technique in making fair use of DVD movies, the DMCA does not impose even an
arguable limitation on the opportunity to make a variety of traditional fair uses of DVD movies, such
as commenting on their content, quoting excerpts from their screenplays, and even recording portions
of the video images and sounds on film or tape by pointing a camera, a camcorder, or a microphone at
a monitor as it displays the DVD movie. The fact that the resulting copy will not be as perfect or as
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Measures to scan hard disks and sundry spyware pushed on individual users were the
subject of debate in Congress. 125 Yet, until the DMCA and in the entire history of
copyright, measures destined to control end-users were by far the exception and not
the rule. 126
Another huge shift in the application of copyright exceptions is of course that online
access has replaced distribution of copies with licensing. Hence, the first-sale
doctrine, perhaps one the most important "exceptions" to copyright, is fast
disappearing. This applies to professional users, such as in inter-library loans
situations, but also to individuals who can no longer pass on content that they no
longer wish to use to other users.
IV. The Way Forward

A. The Reverse Three-step Test
Fair use is one of the keys to understand the way forward I am proposing. I am not
suggesting that U.S.-style fair use be introduced in all countries. Clearly, however,
fair use is a much more flexible and adaptable doctrine with respect to new forms of
use than purpose-specific exception, 127 most of which are not technologically neutral.
128
This explains why its introduction is being considered in a number of countries
currently using the more restrictive fair dealing exceptions. 129

manipulable as a digital copy obtained by having direct access to the DVD movie in its digital form,
provides no basis for a claim of unconstitutional limitation of fair use.
Id. at 459.
125
See, e.g., H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. (2002) (providing controversial remarks by Rep. Howard Berman (DCA)).
126
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
127
See supra notes 12 and 87.
128
Although it has to be said that technological neutrality is not always desirable. Applied to a regulation, it
means that the regulation will apply to new technologies, the invention or development of which cannot be
foreseen. The pre-regulation of those technologies may produce undesirable consequences and even prevent the
deployment of new technologies. See also Gervais, supra note 40, at 120; Ruth Okediji, Toward An
International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 75 (2000).
129
For example, Canada. See Supporting Culture and Innovation: Report on the Provisions and Operation of
the Copyright Act, § B2, at 33-37 (Oct. 2002), available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/rp/section92eng.pdf.
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If one can agree with the premise that fair use reflects an appropriate set of criteria to
balance the rights of copyright holders and the needs and interests of users, I suggest
it could serve as a basis to build the copyright of the future. 130 To do this, we must
internationalize the test by combining it with the Berne three-step test. 131
Fair use is an exception to copyright, 132 or more precisely a test to determine
whether a use of copyrighted content not authorized by the rightsholder constitutes an
infringement of the copyright. In the same way, the three-step test is the accepted
international standard to determine whether an exception to copyright in national
legislation is TRIPS-compliant. 133
What I suggest is reversing the test, based on the assumption that what the exception
(whether fair use in domestic U.S. law or the three-step test at the multilateral level)
does not allow is what in fact copyright intended to protect. Expressed in
mathematical terms, if fair use is the "A" universe, then the "non-A" universe contains
uses that require a license. The reversal, as we will see, is both appropriate and
powerful. It is appropriate because it focuses on the effect of the use on rightsholders.
The right, which can be viewed as the "non-exempt" universe, is also effects-based,
thus addressing much of the criticism examined above. 134 It is powerful because it
both solves the issues related to the nature-based bundle now used in most national
laws 135 and is by definition TRIPS-compliant. If uses not allowed by the three-step
test are protected that is, only uses allowed under the three-step test are exempted,
there can be no violation of Berne. Other solutions requiring an amendment to TRIPS
do not have the same appeal, simply because amending the Agreement seems far from
simple politically. 136
130

See Okediji, supra note 128, at 168-69.
See supra Part III.B.
132
For the purposes of this analysis, we do not need to enter into the debate as to whether fair use is a right,
whether one can derogate to fair use by contract, etc. For more on these debates see Lucie M.C.R. Guibault,
Copyright Limitations and Contracts: An Analysis of the Contractual Overridability of Limitations on
Copyright (2002); L. Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users' Rights
191-222 (1991).
133
See supra Part III.B
134
See Guibault, supra note 132, § r.2. (providing a definition of the Problem).
135
Though not all. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
136
Recent debates in the context of the Doha Round have shown that any modification of the TRIPS Agreement
will be extremely difficult to achieve. One reason is that once the Agreement is reopened, all of its contents may
become fair game. An attempt to update the copyright section (Articles 9-14) may thus prompt demands by
others to reopen the patent or enforcement sections. As of March 2004, there were ongoing consultations on
how to convert the 30 August 2003 Decision on paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration (on access to generic
medicines) into an amendment of the TRIPS Agreement. See Gervais, supra note 40, at 43-51.
131
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How does one reverse the test? Starting from a domestic U.S. viewpoint, the
question would simply be as follows: if fair use is fair, then what use is unfair use? I
submit that unfair, that is protected, use would be use that does not meet the two real
steps of the Berne three-step test. Use that interferes with normal commercial
exploitation or unreasonably or unjustifiably prejudices the copyright holder's rights.
Any use that demonstrably and substantially reduces financial benefits that the
copyright owner can reasonably expect to receive under normal commercial
circumstances would be "unfair" without authorization.
How one measures unfairness and interference with normal commercial exploitation
in this context is fundamental. I suggest that the question should not be whether a
user got "value" without paying, but whether the user should have obtained the
content through a normal commercial transaction. 137 Three observations are in order:
First, this clearly applies only to published content. 138 Second, it is not because a
work is unavailable in a given form that taking is ipso facto fair because no normal
commercial transaction is possible. Rightsholders must be given a certain degree of
flexibility in how they make works available on various markets and in various
formats. It also means, however, that market practices are relevant: is the type of use
or user one that would normally be licensed on a transactional or collective basis? Is
the kind of material normally only available on a commercial basis? Finally, it is
essential to view normalcy of commercial exploitation as a dynamic notion that is
influenced by technological development and consumer behavior. It is clear, in my
view, that the Internet may have changed what "normal commercial exploitation"
means. Unlicensed access for private use to material available on the Internet should
in most cases be considered normal. 139
The second step of the Berne test, namely the unreasonable prejudice to legitimate
interests of the rightsholder, is one of public

137

See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
A right of first publication exists in most national laws. In the U.S., fair use of unpublished material has
been limited by a number of court decisions. See Kate O'Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing
Fair Use from the Right of First Publication, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 369 (2001).
139
This is not unprecedented. There are many areas of law, from antitrust to contract formation, where courts
routinely consider relevant market practices. See David McGowan, Recognizing Usages of Trade: A Case
Study from Electronic Commerce, 8 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 167 (2002).
138
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interest versus author's rights. 140 The relevant rights must be those protected under
the Copyright Act. This is where the reasoning blends the two steps (without, one
hopes, becoming circular). The author has a right in respect of any commercially
significant use; use that would normally be the subject of a commercial transaction.
Any situation not covered by this right would be one that is not subject to normal
commercial exploitation and is justified by a valid public interest purpose.
B. Comparison with Other Proposals
There have been various suggestions to create a "use right," because the current
fragmented lists of copyright rights do not mesh with the reality of cyberspace.
Professor Litman suggested such a right in Digital Copyright. 141 Stanford law
professor Lawrence Lessig points in that direction, notably in The Future of Ideas,
first when he discusses the VCR example and the potential for substantial noninfringing uses, 142 and then when he writes:
In responding to the shock that the Internet presents to copyright law, it is of course
important to account for the increased exposure to theft. But the law must also draw a
balance to assure that this proper response to an increased risk of theft does not
simultaneously erase the important range of access and use rights traditionally
protected under copyright law. 143
Professor Andrew Christie has also suggested a use-based copyright right. 144
Professor Christie proposes that patrimonial rights be grouped in two categories:
reproduction and dissemination. 145 Professor

140

One is reminded of Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), in which the Supreme Court wrote:
We conclude that when federal power constitutionally is exerted for the protection of public or
private interests, or both, it becomes the supreme law of the land and cannot be curtailed, circumvented
or extended by a state procedure merely because it will apply some doctrine of private right. To the
extent that the private right may conflict with the public one, the former is superseded.
Id. at 500-01 (emphasis added).
141
Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright: Protecting Intellectual Property on the Internet (2001).
142
Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World 195-96 (2002).
143
Id.
144
See, e.g., Andrew Christie, A Proposal for Simplifying UK Copyright Law, 23 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 26
(2001).
145
Id. at 37-38.
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Ricketson criticized this type of simplification, however. 146 There is also a proposal
to create a specific right to "Internet transmission," 147 which might resolve certain
problems specific to the Internet.
The approach suggested by Professor Jessica Litman is a priori the most interesting,
but as Professor Ginsburg rightly emphasizes, 148 the conceptualization must be
pushed much further. In my opinion, one should also take into account international
treaties, particularly the TRIPS Agreement. 149
Other examples of attempts at simplification can be found in certain national laws.
These attempts are incomplete, and none moves all the way toward an effects-based
paradigm. This being said, the efforts deserve to be underlined. One of the best
examples is the Swiss Copyright Act, which provides, in Article 10, "[t]he author has
the exclusive right to decide when and how his work will be used." 150
China also has a fairly broad notion of copyright, approaching a use right. The
relevant provisions of the Copyright Law 151 read as follows:
Article 55 Exclusive Rights
(1) Unless otherwise provided, the author shall have the exclusive right to use
his work, in whole or in part, including notably the right to disclose, publish
and economically exploit it in any form, either directly or indirectly, within the
limits of the law;
(2) The guarantee of the pecuniary benefits deriving from exploitation of the
work shall constitute the basic objective, in economic terms, of legal
protection. 152
The Canadian government recently opened the door to a broad reflection on this
subject by putting on the agenda a review of the question of "clarification and
simplification of the law." 153
146

See Sam Ricketson, Simplifying Copyright Law: Proposals from Down Under, 21 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 537
(1999).
147
See Mark A. Lemley, Dealing With Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 547, 58283 (2002).
148
Jane C. Ginsburg, Can Copyright Become User-Friendly? Review: Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright
(Prometheus Books 2001), 25 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 71, 83 (2002).
149
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
150
Loi fédérale sur le droit d'auteur et les droits voisins, 9 Oct. 1992.
151
Decree-Law (Consolidation), of August 16, 1999, No. 43/99/M (WIPO translation).
152
Id. (emphasis added).
153
Supporting Culture and Innovation: Report on the Provisions and Operation of the Copyright Act, supra note
129, at 51.
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These proposals are interesting and many reflect or incorporate solutions to the
problem of copyright laws and treaties: a fragmented bundle of rights focusing on the
nature of the use rather than its effects.
What I am suggesting is to go a step further and use the recognized international test
now applicable to all copyright exceptions as the basis to determine the appropriate
scope of copyright and, by way of consequence, the appropriate exceptions. That
scope should extend to the control of only commercially significant forms of normal
exploitation, the normalcy of exploitation being measured dynamically in light of
changing technological possibilities and societal norms.
Two additional remarks are in order. My reasoning only applies to the so-called
economic rights. 154 Moral rights of authorship and integrity, protected by the Berne
Convention, should be analyzed separately. Exceptions to such moral rights cannot be
based on commercial exploitation, but on a combined test of public interest 155 and
practicality.
Second, the approach I am suggesting has the advantage of being compatible with
existing international treaties. Trying to renegotiate the main copyright treaties would
not be easy and by the time we are done, digital may have been replaced by "trigital"
technology or whatever comes next, and a host of new challenges for copyright, or
should I say "useright" lawyers.

154

See supra note 33.
As to the public interest defense generally, it is available in Australia in respect of at least government
documents. See Australia v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd., (1980) 147 C.L.R. 39. The public interest defense is
also available in the United Kingdom, however, there are U.K. precedents that limit the application of copyright
protection on grounds of public interest. In Ashdown v. Tel. Group, Ltd, [2001] 4 All E.R. 666 (C.A.), the
court ruled that freedom of expression was a valid defense to copyright infringement. It is worth quoting at
some length the decision of the court.
[C]opyright is essentially not a positive but a negative right. No provision of the . . . Copyright Act
confers in terms, upon the owner of a copyright in a literary work, the right to publish it. The Act gives
the owner of the copyright the right to prevent others from doing that which the Act recognises the
owner alone has a right to do. Thus copyright is antithetical to freedom of expression. It prevents all,
save the owner of the copyright, from expressing information in the form of the literary work protected
by the copyright.
Id. P 30. "[T]he defense to a claim for breach of copyright that can be mounted on the basis of 'public interest.'
This is not a statutory defence, but one which arises at common law, . . ." Id. P 34.
155
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C. Further Considerations on an Effects-Based Test
As mentioned above, 156 one of the weaknesses of copyright law is that it focuses on
the nature of the use. As a result, whether one uses a work for private use, to make
commercial use or to make a transformative use is of no concern as far as the rights
are concerned: what matters is that technically a reproduction has taken place. To
circumvent this structural difficulty, exceptions, for example, for private use 157 and
parody, 158 were added to the mix.
Using an effects-based test would allow courts to draw appropriate distinctions. In
almost all cases, non-transformative commercial reuse will infringe the second or
third part of the three-step test, or both, due to the effect on the market of the
rightsholder(s) and the absence of an overriding public interest. A private use
normally will not have an effect and it may be considered desirable to allow private
use, both because the cost (in terms, for example, of privacy invasion) 159 and the
public interest considerations of favoring broad access to information and culture. It
will thus pass the test. In that case, implementing an effects-based test simply avoids
they current labyrinthine process of determining that there was a reproduction or other
use, the nature-based test, and then looking for an exception.
But the most striking impact would be in the area of transformative reuse. There is a
public interest in allowing creators to reuse existing material, something recognized in
many legal systems, 160 including the United States, where the Supreme Court
arguably stretched the notion of parody well beyond its ordinary meaning to
accommodate this objective. 161
156

See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.D.3.
158
See infra note 161.
159
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
160
For a civil law example, see supra note 98.
161
See Elizabeth Troup Timkovich, The New Significance of the Four Fair Use Factors As Applied to Parody:
Interpreting The Court's Analysis in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 5 Tul. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 61, 75
(2003). In this article, the author "attempt[ed] to interpret the Supreme Court's actions in Campbell in a way
that aligns with the public benefit goals of copyright." Id.
The Court's fair use analysis in the context of parody can be explained as shifting the primary fair use
emphasis away from the fourth fair use factor (market harm), where it was placed by the Nation Court
in 1985 in the context of news reporting, to the first fair use factor (purpose of the work). It is plausible
that the Court made this shift knowingly, so as to advance the public policy of copyright, to foster the
creation of new works available to the public. The analysis involved in the Court's evaluation of the
first fair use factor is the most in tune with this public policy question, as it entails determining
157
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By introducing an effects-based test, reuse of material would be allowed not just in
parody cases, but in all cases where a genuine public interest is served by allowing a
new creation to emerge without demonstrably affecting (negatively) the market for
the preexisting work.
Conclusion
This paper first showed that, while exceptions to copyright have historically focused
on the effects of a particular use of protected works, the rights to which these
exceptions apply are based on the nature of the use. This has at least two undesirable
consequences. First, it forces copyright holders to organize the legal structure of
protection against technical forms of use where in fact their real concern is with the
market and the effects that a particular use may have in reducing or enhancing future
market options. Second, there is a logical discrepancy between the right and the
exception which renders exceptions difficult to apply and their borders very difficult
to circumscribe.
In the search for a solution to enhance the current situation, I suggested that an
effects-based norm (a new copyright right) would better respond to problems that
copyright holders currently face, in particular on the Internet, while enhancing legal
security for users by increasing the correlation between the right and the exception.
Because the three-step test found in Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention is now the
foundation for all exceptions to intellectual property rights in treaties concluded since
1994, including the TRIPS Agreement, I first studied this fundamental test and its
application in key national and regional laws to determine what uses would be
allowed under it. I then suggested reversing the test, as it were, to determine the
scope of disallowed uses, that is, those to which the exclusive right of the copyright
owner should apply. The proposal, in effect, is that rights be defined to mirror
permissible exceptions under Berne Article 9(2) and Article 13 of TRIPS. In doing
so, international copyright treaties would no longer constitute a set of minimum
standards with a cap on permissible exceptions but rather coherent normative
approach to

whether the disputed parody has transformed the original copyrighted work into something new. The
fourth fair use factor has far less significance in this analysis, as, ideally, a transformative parody
should not supplant market demand for the copyrighted work upon which it is based.
Id.
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regulating commercially significant uses of material, including on the Internet.
I then analyzed this proposal against extant proposals to improve or simplify
international copyright norms. The last section of the article demonstrates that the use
of an effects-based test would both simplify the determination of infringements and
allow greater transformative reuse of protected material.

